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Chapter 4
IMPLICATIONS OF THE CRISIS
FOR US ADJUSTMENT NEEDS
1. Introduction
The US economy is arguably following an unsus-
tainable trajectory. The main indicators of this are a
large current account deficit, a large federal budget
deficit and trend-wise increasing costs of Social
Security and Medicare. In this chapter, we will dis-
cuss these observations and to what extent the
financial and economic crisis may have changed the
outlook. Before this, we need to define what we
mean by sustainability. An often used definition of
sustainability is that the inter-temporal budget
restriction is satisfied. In the context of fiscal sus-
tainability, this means that the discounted sum of
current and future government revenues (at least)
covers the discounted sum of current and future
outlays plus the value of current outstanding debt.
Similarly, a sustainable path of current accounts
must imply that the discounted value of income gen-
erated by exports of goods and services covers the
cost of imports and other transfers to abroad plus
the initial value of foreign debt. Sustainability
implies that that the ratios of government debt to
GDP and foreign debt to GDP do not follow an
explosive path.1
Defining a sustainable fiscal policy as one that satis-
fies the inter-temporal budget constraint is not free of
problems. First, it can be argued that it is trivial in the
sense that if extraordinary income, like inflation
taxes or the implicit income generated by defaults is
included, all government spending will be financed in
one way or another. Second, the definition requires
that the future is predictable, which is difficult, but
the definition also allows different future scenarios.
The multitude of different future possibilities calls
for other criteria to be included in the definition of
sustainability. Specifically, one may require that the
future paths of government revenues and outlay
should (i) be fair from an inter-generational perspec-
tive, (ii) be efficient, for example, not involving
strongly increasing or variable tax rates, and (iii) that
they should be politically feasible. The latter is cer-
tainly an important issue in the US, where tax paths
that would be easy to implement in Europe may be
politically impossible in the US.
Despite these caveats, an important policy question
is whether current fiscal policy, including current
spending programmes and tax law, is sustainable
given forecasts of economic growth and demo-
graphic change. If this is not the case, creditors will
in some way or another force the government to
change its policy. Pre-crisis estimates of the long-
run sustainability of US fiscal policy suggests that
government income would have to be raised and/or
expenditure cut. Gokhale and Smetters (2003) cal-
culated that the required change is dramatic – to be
sustainable, the government’s fiscal balance would
have to be permanently improved by 6.5 percent of
GDP over pre-crisis long run forecasts (see
Box 4.2). To the extent that the crisis will have long-
run negative effects on economic growth and activ-
ity, the required adjustments are even larger. The
Congressional Budget Office (CBO, 2009a), has
calculated that the required adjustment has
increased and is now 8.1 percent of GDP. They also
show that by waiting, the required adjustment con-
tinues to grow; to 9.7, 12.1 and 15.5 percent of
GDP if adjustments wait for another one, two or
three decades, respectively. These figures illustrate
the claim by Kotlikoff (2006) that the US is going
bankrupt.
Recognising that fiscal sustainability requires a long-
run perspective on future spending and revenues, our
aim in this chapter will, however, be narrower. We will
focus on two questions. We will first describe how fis-
cal deficits have evolved over recent years and in par-
ticular study how the forecasts for the coming decade
have changed during the crisis. This allows us to dis-
cuss whether the crisis has increased the urgency of
fiscal consolidation. The second question is to what
extent the current account deficit of the US is an indi-
cator of a non-sustainable consumption pattern that
needs to be corrected.  1 See, e.g., Neck and Sturm (2008) on this.Before discussing the empirical issues, we need to
demonstrate some arithmetic facts and make some
definitions. The definition of sustainability as
derived from the inter-temporal budget constraint
of the government implies that public debt as a
share of GDP is non-explosive. However, this does
not rule out a permanent deficit. As shown in
Box 4.1, a permanent fiscal deficit d will lead to a
stable debt-to-GDP ratio of d/g where  g is the
growth rate of nominal GDP. If, for example the
deficit is 3 percent, a 5 percent growth rate of nom-
inal GDP leads to a stable debt-to-GDP ratio of
60 percent. Given that interest rate on government
debt tends to be larger than the growth rate of
GDP, a positive debt crowds out other types of
spending or requires higher government revenues,
i.e. it must be financed by a primary surplus. In
steady state this crowding out is equal to the rela-
tive difference between the interest rate and the
growth rate times the deficit. As an example, if
interest rates are 6 percent and the growth rate of
GDP is 5 percent, the interest rate is 20 percent
larger than the growth rate. A permanent deficit of
say 3 percent thus requires a primary surplus of
(0.2 * 0.03 =) 0.6 percent of GDP. During the tran-
sition to the steady state from a lower debt ratio,
the crowding out is smaller than in steady state.
Therefore, the transition involves inter-generational
transfers from future to current generations.
2. US government debt
Let us now focus on the development of the debt of
the US government. An immediate problem is that
there are a number of different definitions of gov-
ernment debt. The two main dimensions in which
these measures differ are (i) what branches and levels
of government are included and (ii) whether the
measure is gross or net of financial assets like loans
to the private sector, shares in publically traded com-
panies and foreign exchange reserves. A particular
problem, making international comparisons diffi-
cult, is that assets and liabilities related to the pen-
sion system are treated differently in different coun-
tries. For example, the US government has an un-
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Box 4.1  
The arithmetic of stable deficits 
The law-of-motion for public debt can be written 
) 1 /( ) ( 1 1      t t t t g d b b      ( 1 )
where bt+1 is the debt-to-GDP ratio in period t+1, gt+1 is the nominal growth rate of GDP between period t and t+1 and dt
is the fiscal deficit. Here we note that the term 1+ gt+1, i.e., GDP-growth, tends to reduce the debt ratio. All else equal, a 
high rate of GDP growth dilutes the debt-to-GDP ratio by spreading a given debt over a larger GDP base. 
It now follows immediately that as long as growth is positive, any constant deficit will lead to a non-explosive debt ratio
and is therefore consistent with the general definition of sustainability. Specifically, assuming for simplicity a constant
GDP growth rate, a constant deficit d leads to a constant debt ratio of d/g. We see this by assuming all variables in 
equation (1) to be constant and then solving for b; 
g
d
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This is, however, generally not a free lunch for the government, since a higher debt requires more interest payments. 
Specifically, note that the fiscal deficit can be written 
t t r t p b r d         ( 2 )
where rt is the interest rate on public debt and pt is the primary surplus, defined as government revenues minus net interest 
payments. Using the steady state result b=d/g in this equation and solving for p, we find that in a steady state with deficit 





 .       ( 3 )
Thus, as long as the interest rate is higher than the GDP growth rate, a permanent deficit leads to a debt buildup that 
requires a permanent primary surplus. Specifically, at any point in time, sustainability requires that outstanding
government debt equals the discounted sum of all future primary surpluses.  
The arithmetic of budget deficits can easily be adapted to the issue of sustainability of the foreign affairs of a country. The
equivalent of a budget deficit is a current account deficit, and a permanent current account deficit is therefore in principle
consistent with sustainability. Specifically, a constant current account deficit CA leads to a stable foreign debt ratio bf equal 
to CA/g, where g is the growth rate of nominal GDP. The counterpart of the primary surplus is the trade balance plus other
net income from abroad not related to the debt position. Sustainability requires that the initial foreign debt is matched by 
future surpluses from trade and other income.  EEAG Report 2010 103
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funded pension liability to its own employees
amounting to around 10 percent of GDP that is not
included in the official debt figures.2 For other coun-
tries, this implicit debt may be larger or smaller than
for the US.
In Figure 4.1, we report three
measures of the US government’s
debt. The upper curve is the
OECD’s measure of general gov-
ernment gross financial liabilities
including forecasts for year
2009–2011.3 Here, all branches
and levels of the government are
consolidated, but financial assets
of the government are not de-
ducted from the debt. The next
curve from above is the OECD
measure of net debt, where the government’s financial
assets are deducted from its financial liabilities. The
third curve is the Congressional Budget Office’s
(CBO) measure of US federal government debt held
by the public.4 Assets and intra-government assets
and liabilities are here netted out. 
Box x 4.2 2  
Long g run n fiscal l and d generational l imbalances s 
 
To evaluate the long run fiscal sustainability and inter-generational fairness, the development of government debt is an
insufficient indicator. A major reason is that various long-term government payment obligations, notably in Social
Security and Medicare, are underfinanced and the shortfall is not included in the national debt. Gokhale and Smetters
(2003) argue that the government should report two more informative measures, namely the fiscal imbalance (FI) and the
generational imbalance (GI). The first is defined as the difference between the present value of projected government
spending (not counting interest payments) plus current debt and the present discounted value of projected revenues. Both
spending and revenues are calculated using current spending programmes and tax law but take into account trends in
demography and expected growth. If FI is positive, it means that sooner or later government spending must be reduced
and/or revenues (taxes) increased to prevent government bankruptcy – i.e., the current fiscal system is not sustainable.
The generational imbalance is defined as the share of the fiscal imbalance that is due to past and living generations. A
higher GI measure thus implies that past and living generations are passing on a debt to future generations.
Gokhale and Smetters (2003) estimate that FI is of an order of 4 times GDP, i.e. much larger than the official debt. About
80 percent of this debt is due to the Medicare system being seriously underfinanced in the long run. Around 40 percent of
the deficit in the Medicare system is due to past and living generations. This means that past and living generations are
handing over a debt larger than GDP to future generations via Medicare. The imbalance in social security is smaller but is
mostly due to past and living generations, implying that another debt almost as large as GDP is handed over to future
generations.
The calculations by Gokhale and Smetters imply that US fiscal policy is very far from being sustainable. Changes must
necessarily be made and the later these are undertaken the larger they must be. If measures are taken immediately, they are
still very large. If no spending cuts are undertaken, revenues must permanently be increased by 6.5 percent of GDP. If this 
extra revenue is to be achieved by income taxes, these have to be raised by 16.6 percentage points according to Gokhale
and Smetters calculations.Alternatively, Social Security and Medicare spending could be permanently cut in half.
The European Commission regularly publishes sustainability reports (EU 2009). The key index is the S2 indicator that in
principle is similar to the GI measure. However, rather than expressing the deficit in the inter-temporal budget, it is
defined as the necessary improvement in the government budget to reach sustainability.  The S2 indicator shows that also
EU needs to change its fiscal policies. In particular, the aging population implies that the fiscal balance of the EU as a 
whole needs to be improved by 3 percent permanently. This number should be compared to the 6.5 percent necessary
improvement for the US. In the latest sustainability report, the consequences for sustainability of various post-crisis
scenarios are evaluated. It is shown that if growth remains lower than what was previously expected for the coming
decade, only gradually returning to trend at 2020, an extra percentage point improvement in the fiscal balance is required
to reach sustainability.  
Figure 4.1
2 OECD reports that this debt was 10.2 per-
cent of GDP in 2005.
3 OECD Economic Outlook No. 86 Annex
Tables.
4 Historical data from CBO (2008) and
forecasts from CBO (2009).In Figure 4.1, we see that the
curves for OECD net and gross
debt are fairly parallel. A closer
look reveals that net debt has
been around 70 percent of the
gross figure for the whole period.
The higher debt level for the fore-
cast years 2009–2011, shows that
while the net debt remains at
around 70 percent of gross debt,
the difference has increased from
less than 20 to close to 30 per-
centage points. We also note that
while the CBO measure of net
debt differs from OECD mea-
sures, the differences are quite
small, reflecting small levels of
debt in state and local govern-
ment. Since the net debt is the one most relevant for
our notion of sustainability and since CBO produces
biannual long-run forecasts of the US fiscal balances,
we will use the CBO measure for the analysis in this
section.
In January 2008, just before the full consequences of
the financial crisis for the macroeconomic develop-
ments became apparent, the CBO forecasted that
the fiscal deficit would continue to be on a decreas-
ing trend. After three years of declining deficits,
CBO forecasted a small reduction in deficits to
around 1.5 percent of GDP for 2008–2011, a small-
er deficit for 2012 and surpluses thereafter. Thus,
the pre-crises forecast implied substantially falling
debt-to-GDP ratios over the coming decade. That
meant that the trend towards increasing debt was
broken. This is shown in Figure 4.2 as the blue solid
line, where data from 2008 are the forecasts done in
January 2008. 
The CBO forecasts changed dramatically during the
macro-financial crisis. In August 2009, the forecast
was that the debt of the US government would in-
crease at a high speed. The increasing trend in the
debt as a share of GDP during the 1980s seems to be
back and perhaps even stronger than before, as indi-
cated by the red dashed line. 
CBO’s federal deficit forecasts calculated in January
2009 and August 2009 are shown in Figure 4.3. The
largest change in the forecast is for the year 2009. In
January 2008, the forecast was a deficit of 1.5 per-
cent of GDP. Half way into 2009, this forecast had
changed to an unprecedented deficit of 11.2 per-
cent. In fact, this is almost twice as large as the pre-
vious record deficit of 6.0 percent in 1983. Fur-
thermore, the CBO forecast
implies that the deficit remains
above the previous record in
2010 and 2011. 
Furthermore, while GDP growth
was according to the 2008 CBO
forecast projected to rebound
substantially in 2012, the budget
deficit is not expected to return to
the previous track. The 2008 real
GDP growth forecast was a mod-
erate 2.9 percent for 2012 and
2.6 percent for 2013 and 2014.
During this period, the 2008 fore-
cast implied a turnaround in
deficits, from negative in 2012 to
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positive from 2013 onwards. The revised CBO growth
forecasts implied a high 5.0 percent real GDP growth
rate for 2012 and 4.5 and 3.0 percent growth for 2013
and 2014, respectively. Despite these optimistic
growth forecasts, deficit-to-GDP ratios are projected
to be close to 4 percentage points higher during this
period than previously forecasted. Subsequently, there
is even a tendency for the discrepancy between the two
forecasts to increase. 
The gigantic increase in the deficit for 2009 is due to
a 4.1 percentage point reduction in revenues and a
5.7 percentage point increase in outlays. As seen in
Figure 4.4, the difference between the two revenue
forecasts is temporary, reflecting a projected re-
bound of tax bases. By 2011, the difference is
1.1 percentage points and falls to close to zero after
that. The picture for outlays is quite different and
depicted in Figure 4.5. Even at the end of the fore-
cast period, i.e., in 2018, total
outlays as percentage of GDP
are in the 2009 forecast are close
to 4 percentage points higher
than in the 2008 forecast. Most
of the increases in outlays are
projected to fade away over time.
For example, the Troubled Asset
Relief Program (TARP) and
costs associated with the sup-
port to Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac add a full 3 percent of
GDP to the projected deficit for
2009. The American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act also adds
substantial amounts to the fed-
eral deficit. This comprehensive
fiscal stimulus act contains tax
cuts to individuals and firms as
well as increased spending on
infrastructure, education and
transfers such as more generous
unemployment benefits. The
CBO estimated that the bill in-
creases the deficits by 1.3 per-
cent of GDP for the fiscal year
2009, which ended on 30 Sep-
tember 2009. The budgetary
effects peak during the fiscal
year 2010 at 2.8 percent of GDP
and then fall to below 1 percent
of GDP the following year. 
The large debt build-up during
the crisis means increasing inter-
est payments in the long run. In the 2009 forecast,
interest payments are nearly three times as high as in
the 2008 forecast, i.e., 3.3 percent rather than 1.2 per-
cent of GDP. 
As we noted in the introductory section, sustainabili-
ty requires that the outstanding government debt is
balanced by future primary surpluses. Before the 2009
crisis, government debt was in the order of 35 percent
of GDP. For this debt ratio to remain stable, future
primary surpluses needed to average a few 10ths of a
percent of GDP. In Figure 4.6, we depict the primary
surplus forecast before and after the crisis. Before the
crisis the forecasts implied the primary surplus should
stabilise at around 2 percent of GDP. This clearly
exceeded what was necessary to keep the debt ratio
constant but was, as noted above, far from sufficient
to compensate for the projected long-term increases in
Figure 4.4
Figure 4.5the costs of Medicare and Medicaid after the depict-
ed forecast period. 
The 2009 crisis has changed the picture quite dramat-
ically. The debt build-up due to the crisis is around
50 percent of GDP, which will require additional
future primary surpluses in the order of a quarter to
a third of a percent of GDP. Instead, the latest fore-
cast implies primary surpluses around 2 percentage
points of GDP lower than the pre-crisis forecast.
Clearly, if there were doubts about fiscal sustainabili-
ty before the crisis, these doubts have strengthened
substantially. There now seems to be no other way for
the US than to immediately reconsider its fiscal poli-
cies. This must be done sooner or later, but on
grounds of intergenerational equity and efficiency,
sooner is better than later. 
3. US current account
For some time, the US current account has been at the
centre of policy discussions about the so called global
imbalances. A key feature of these imbalances is the
large current account deficit in the US, financed by
surpluses in swiftly developing Asian countries,
notably China, and in oil exporting countries. The
sustainability of the current account deficit of the US
has been questioned. Furthermore, the large demand
for liquid assets from surplus countries has led to low
interest rates in a time of high output growth rates
and, in particular, optimistic expectations about
future growth. 
Although it is clear that a balanced current account
at all times should not be a policy target, a large cur-
rent account deficit is worri-
some. If it is unsustainable, it
must eventually be corrected,
and there is ample empirical evi-
dence that such corrections often
are done in the form of a “sud-
den stop”, where creditors
abruptly halt the financing of a
deficit. If such a sudden stop
were to happen to the US, this
would obviously have dramatic
consequences for the global
economy. Even if the US current
account deficit was not directly
responsible for the crisis, it con-
tinues to be a worry. However, it
is important to note that there
are substantial discrepancies in different measures of
the US current account. As we will see, these mea-
sures differ substantially in how alarming a picture
they paint. By definition, a country’s current
account deficit is equal to the change in its net for-
eign liabilities. Measuring the current account by
summing flows of income should yield the same
result as measuring the change in the values of assets
and liabilities. However, since income generated by
revaluations in assets and liabilities are not necessar-
ily recorded accurately, there are large discrepancies
between the measures.5
Figure 4.7 shows two measures of the US current
account from 1981 to 2008. The solid line with
squares is the OECD measure, calculated from
transactions data. The solid line without squares is
instead measured as the yearly change in the net
asset position of the US. The dotted lines are linear
regression trends. As we see, there are substantial
differences between the two curves. The transaction-
based measure is consistently negative, except for a
small surplus in 1981 and 1991. There is also a
strong negative trend such that the current account
worsens by 1.7 percentage points per decade. The
valuation based measure is instead dominated by
large swings, reflecting large revaluations of the
asset positions of the US. The trend in the latter
measure is barely negative at – 0.5 percentage points
per decade. The average deficit over the whole peri-
od differs substantially – it is 2.8 percent of GDP
for the transaction-based measure and only 1.6 per-
cent for the valuation based. The difference is large
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also for the last decade, where the valuation-based
measure is at a deficit of 2.2 percent and the trans-
action based at 4.8 percent. Also including 2009 will
reduce this difference but only by about 1 percent-
age point.
Looking at the two curves, it is clear that the dis-
crepancies between the two current account mea-
sures have increased quite dramatically over time.
To understand this, we need to consider the fact that
behind the trend-wise deterioration of the US net
asset position, there are much larger changes in
gross positions. Since 1986, when the net US foreign
debt was approximately zero, net foreign debt has
increased to 24 percent of GDP in 2008. However,
gross assets have increased from 33 percent in 1986
to 139 percent in 2008 and gross debt from 33 to
164 percent of GDP during the same period. Thus,
the ratio of debt to assets has only increased from
unity to 1.17. Under-reporting of income generated
by the increasing large gross foreign asset position
yields an increasing divergence between the two
measures. Since revaluations of foreign assets and
liabilities are more volatile than export and import,
the volatility of a valuation-based measure increas-
es relative to the OECD measure as gross positions
increase.
As we have seen, both measures of the current
account show a downward trend in the current
account. Clearly, the continuation of these trends is
not consistent with sustainability. However, in exact
parallel to the case of fiscal deficits, sustainability
does not necessarily rule out a stable deficit.
Suppose that the US current account deficit sta-
bilised at some level. In such a scenario, the US net
foreign debt ratio might contin-
ue to increase, but not indefi-
nitely. The reason is that nomi-
nal GDP growth tends to
reduce debt as a fraction of
GDP. When GDP grows, the
debt can grow at the same speed
without increasing the debt-to-
GDP ratio. Since a growing
debt is equivalent to a current
account deficit, the latter is con-
sistent with a constant debt
ratio. Applying the calculations
in Box 4.1, we find that this
constant debt ratio is given by
the current account deficit
divided by the nominal growth
rate of GDP.
Again assuming a 5 percent growth rate of US
nominal GDP, a current account deficit of say
3 percent would lead to the foreign debt stabilising
at  3/5 = 60 percent of GDP, i.e. approximately a
doubling of the current debt. A debt of 60 percent
of GDP is large but not large enough to be obvi-
ously impossible to sustain. Again in parallel to the
case of fiscal deficits, a constant debt ratio needs to
be balanced by a positive trade balance in the same
way government debt must be financed by a posi-
tive primary surplus. In other words, part of the
revenue generated from abroad must be used to pay
the percentage difference between the interest rate
and GDP growth times the deficit and cannot be
used for consuming imports. Given that the interest
rate on US foreign debt remains only marginally
above the growth rate of GDP, sustainability in
itself requires only quite small increases in the
trade balance to stabilise this higher foreign debt
level.
So far, we have implicitly assumed that the return on
assets and liabilities is equal. However, the US has
consistently earned a higher return on its foreign
assets than what it pays on its foreign debt.
Gourinchas and Rey (2007a), for instance, report
that over the post-Bretton Woods period, the aver-
age real return on US foreign assets has been as high
6.8 percent while the real interest rate paid on liabil-
ities has been 3.5 percent. While there is some
debate on the magnitude of the US return privilege
(Curcuru et al. 2008), there is little doubt that net
inflow of asset income has been historically positive.
To the extent that this return privilege remains, a
Figure 4.7more highly leveraged portfolio generates more
income to the US and even a portfolio where liabil-
ities are larger than assets can generate a positive
income that can be used to finance a negative trade
balance.
US net nominal capital income from abroad is
ra A–rl L, where ra and rl are the nominal rates of
return on assets and liabilities, respectively. As
noted by Obstfeld and Taylor (2005), there is a tip-
ping point, given by ra/rl, such that only if the ratio
L/A is larger than the tipping point, net capital
income is negative. Given the historical real capital
returns and adding an inflation rate of 2 percent,
the tipping point is 1.6, i.e., substantially above the
current value, indicating that if historical rates are
maintained, the US still makes money on its foreign
asset portfolio. 
Suppose that the real rate of return paid on US for-
eign debt remains at 3.5 percent and that the infla-
tion rate is 2 percent. Suppose also that the current
account stabilizes at 3 percent. Then, if the US had
no foreign assets or had no return privilege, the
trade balance must be positive at a value given by
one third of a percent of GDP if the nominal GDP
growth rate is 5 percent. With current assets of
139 percent of GDP and a return privilege of
3.3 percent, this generates excess revenues of 4.5 per-
cent of GDP, i.e., much larger than the trade balance
required without the return privilege. If the return
privileges were to disappear, the US would therefore
need to make very substantial adjustments, in par-
ticular reduce consumption very dramatically. Such
a change would most likely require large dollar
depreciation. 
Recently, several authors have analyzed the reasons
for the return privilege. Gourinchas and Rey (2007a)
decompose the return difference into a return effect
and a composition effect. The latter comes from bor-
rowing in one type of assets and investing in another,
for example borrowing in fixed income short maturity
instruments and investing in stocks. The return effect
instead arises to the extent that the US manages to get
higher returns on assets than on liabilities within each
asset class. 
It is well known that maturity conversion is an
important part of US foreign investment strategy –
Gourinchas and Rey call the US the “venture capi-
talist” of the world. By investing in foreign equity
and borrowing in short maturity bonds, the expect-
ed return on assets is higher than the cost of bor-
rowing. Quite surprisingly, however, Gourinchas
and Rey (2007a) find that the return privileges are
mostly accounted for by the return effect. Of the
three plus percentage point return privilege in the
post-Bretton Woods period, only about a quarter
can be accounted for by the composition effect.
Doubt is cast on this result, however, by Curcuru et
al. (2008), who argue that the US earns little excess
return within asset classes. As yet, this issue is unre-
solved. 
It seems reasonable that the more developed financial
markets in the US allow its citizens to take on more
risk. Thus, the US is in a better position to take ad-
vantage of the equity premium. To the extent the
return premium is due to the equity premium, it seems
reasonably safe to assume that it will remain. Less,
however, is known about return differences within
similar assets. In a recent paper, Hassan (2008), shows
that returns on similar assets denominated in different
currencies do vary systematically. Assets denominated
in currencies of large OECD countries have paid sub-
stantially lower returns over the period 1980–2007.
The estimates are stark – increasing the size of a coun-
try from zero to 10 percent of world GDP reduces the
rate of return by over 2 percent. The result appears
quite robust and holds for bonds of different maturi-
ties as well as for stocks. Hassan also provides a theo-
retical explanation for his findings. A shock to the
productivity in a country affects its real exchange rate.
Since a large country has a larger impact on the
world, its exchange rate is more negatively correlated
with world consumption of tradables. Therefore,
assets denominated in the currencies of large coun-
tries provide a better insurance against fluctuations in
tradables consumption and yields a lower expected
return. 
There is a systematic currency bias in the US for-
eign portfolio – assets are more often denominated
in foreign currency than liabilities. Therefore,
Hassan’s results point to a fundamental factor indi-
cating that the return privilege of the US may
remain, also if it is not due to maturity conversion.
But clearly, much caution is warranted regarding
this prediction. The surprisingly strong apprecia-
tion of the dollar in autumn 2008, when the crisis
took a sharp negative turn, and the dollar behav-
iour afterwards, have also focused attention on the
hedging properties of different currencies and
assets against “disaster” risk. According to a lead-
ing opinion among market participants, also men-
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tioned by Fed chairman Ben Bernanke in a public
speech in November 2009, the US currency
strengthens whenever markets’ assessment of glob-
al systemic risk increases. Specifically, this opinion
seemingly contrasts different regimes driving global
risk factors, whereas fear of disasters would moti-
vate a flight to quality into the largest economic
and military power of the world. This observation
points in the same direction as the argument of
Hassan (2008) – the US enjoys a return privilege
because of the currency composition of its assets
and liabilities – although, again, the quantitative
relevance is unclear. 
4. Concluding discussion
The medium-run forecasts of government debt
before the crisis were consistent with sustainability,
showing a primary surplus for the coming decade. In
the longer run, however, there is no doubt that very
large adjustments are necessary and will be under-
taken, voluntarily or by the force of creditors. In
particular the cost of Medicare, Medicaid and Social
Security is forecasted to grow substantially, mostly
due to a larger share of elderly. This is shown in
Figure 4.8. 
The worrisome factors behind the longer run sus-
tainability have certainly not disappeared during the
current economic crisis. The difference between
before and after the crisis is instead that now also the
medium-run forecasts point towards non-sustain-
ability. We are also worried that the discrepancy
between what US citizens’ expectations of what the
government should provide and how much tax they
are willing to pay has widened during the crisis.
Although increased taxes and spending cuts should
not be undertaken before the economy is well on its
way out of the crisis, we urge the US government as
well as fellow economists to help prepare US citizens
to accept substantial changes. A serious discussion
about the introduction of a federal value added tax
and increased personal income taxes must begin
immediately. 
We also believe that the US government should sys-
tematically produce indicators of its long-run fiscal
viability and the consequences for intergenerational
redistribution of current policies. Such indicators
should be based on forecasts of spending and rev-
enues given current laws and long-term projections of
growth and demographic change. Sustainability indi-
cators are already produced for the EU by the Euro-
pean Commission but would seem to be also useful
for the US An important purpose of a systematic
reporting of sustainability indicators is to affect the
public debate. Hopefully this can lead to an increased
awareness that spending programmes must be
financed. Then, the government’s inter-temporal bud-
get constraint may be satisfied in a process with a
deliberate consideration of the consequences for effi-
ciency and intergenerational equity of different poli-
cies. The alternative is that creditors will eventually
force a change in policy in which these considerations
are likely to be absent.
Regarding the current account deficit, we are less
worried by the actual deficit and its long run trends
than by the US’s vulnerability to its foreign return
privileges. Given that these remain, they yield a suf-
ficient income to finance a large trade deficit. Were
they, however, to disappear,
quite dramatic adjustments
would be required, likely includ-
ing a large depreciation of the
dollar. It is difficult to make
forecasts for the return privilege.
On the one hand, it appears
unlikely that financial markets in
China and other emerging mar-
ket economies will develop
quickly. On the other hand, the
restructuring of the financial
sector in the US made necessary
by the current crisis may reduce
its productivity advantage and
thus its ability to generate excess
returns on the world capital
markets.
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